1.5 – Presentism vs Eternalism

There is no absolute need for anything, but the reason is the true nature of philosophy: the love of knowledge. It’s important because I want to know that answer, and would hope that you do too.

Perhaps a better question than ‘which of these two systems more accurately represents reality’ would be: ‘what would be the resulting difference–even theoretically?’ I think this question digs a little deeper, and would even result in a better answer to the original question.


Awaiting your response,



3.2 – Sourcing Information

Ethics are messy. Very few people understand their own foundations for ethical discussions, and those who do won’t necessarily agree, and even if they agree on the foundations, they can still disagree on the implications of those foundations. That being said, I’ll take a stab at it.

I think using information that comes from an unethical source is okay. I do have to clarify. If some life-saving research was 99% complete, and one more person had to die to complete the cure that could save millions, it wouldn’t be right to kill that one more person. But if you have information gained by the blood of the innocent, what good is there in letting it gather dust? The evil cannot be undone, so do good in the name of the lives that were lost.

Suppose an unscrupulous scientist was doing his nefarious experiments in hiding, but was able to release his findings on the internet as he came across them. This starts getting into some grayer territory, but I say use the information. Stop him. Let justice be brought to him, but if what he provides could save lives, use it.

In short, murder is wrong, but saving lives is saving lives.


Awaiting your response,


2.3 – Personal Identity

Alright, you appear to have dodged the question by asking a more interesting one. And that’s not a complaint.

I believe the question is this: what is it that endures/perdures?

You brought up the idea of character as something that is made up of how others think of us and as something that defines us. I believe you changed your mind from saying that it is a defining part of us, but not in the way that I think makes the most sense. If what others thought of us defined us and all a particular someone thought of you was nasty things then those nasty things things would define us, and I think that would be a bummer, but something being a bummer isn’t a valid counter-argument.

To illustrate my point I’ll use my 80 year old self again, this time with no siblings. If I come across a picture of my mother holding me in her arms shortly after giving birth to me, I would say that she was very much holding me. But at that point in time, there are very few people who have made an opinion of me at all. My parents sure, and perhaps the doctors, but 80 years later, they’ve all passed away, God rest their hypothetical souls. Yet I’m still me.

Put another way, imagine that everyone you’ve ever known, loved, made eye contact with, accidentally called on the phone or interacted with in any way whatsoever suddenly vanished. You don’t stop being you. Life as you know it would certainly change, but you’re still you.

On to locale. I believe your definition of locale as a definer of identity acts as a sort of recursive function, meaning that what you are at any given moment is dependent on where you were the moment prior. That’s a fancy way of say that you need a smooth 4D snake.  Suppose you could teleport, there is a frog that can teleport, and you both have very good timing and cooperation skills. Now suppose that at the same instant, you and the frog teleported to each other’s locations. Have you now become the frog? And the frog you? If you say no, then there must be something else that makes you you.

Now, suppose in your tale of woe about the twins raised in a lab, that one day the scientists came to each of the twins and informed them of their twin, but told them that one of them had to die, and that they had to choose which one would be killed. If the twins were truly the same, this choice wouldn’t even make sense. Killing either of them would be killing both of them. But they aren’t the same person. Choosing the other twin to die would be an act of self-preservation, and choosing themselves would be an act of self-sacrifice, because they each have an independent self. Their themness is the defining factor between them.

So if it’s not location, character, physical bits nor genetics, that endures/perdures then what is it?

I say personality. Personality is what I’m defining to be the part of you that makes you do any given thing in any given situation. If, at any given moment, there was something that resembled you, then it would be you if and only if it would do the same things you would do and it wouldn’t be you if wouldn’t do the same things. This even applies to normal progression through time whether you’re a endurantist or perdurantist. You are you from a moment ago because you’re doing the same things you would a moment ago if you from a moment ago were at this moment now.

I’ll add a slight caveat just to be safe. You require active subjective experience in addition to your personality. To see what I mean, imagine that perfect atom-for-atom clone of you were created. This clone would do the same things you would do, so in a sense you would be the same person, but if put in the same afore-imagined position as the twins where you and the clone had to pick which of you were to be killed, you would see that you don’t view the clone as the same person as you. I stated earlier that between the twins, “Their themness is the defining factor between them,” but I didn’t really define what themness was. Themness is active subjective experience. If I have a clone, then I’m still me, and the clone’s not me because I am actively subjectively experiencing myself, and not the clone. I’m seeing out of my own eyes and thinking my own thoughts, and my clone is seeing out of his eyes and thinking his own thoughts, so we have our own distinct themness.

So to answer your question, we do not remain the same, but we do remain ourselves, and from moment to moment what endures/perdures is our personality and our active subjective experience.

But perhaps you have your doubts.


Awaiting your response,


1.3 – Presentism vs Eternalism

Nailed it with the presentism, close on eternalism.

Eternalism as “The idea that all moments exist simultaneously” is correct, but “This means that the past, present, and future all occupy the same point of space-time, and are all occurring at once,” is incorrect. The past, present, and future all occupy all points in space-time.

I think I know what you mean though. To exist outside of time is to hardly exist at all from our view. There is no movement, no thought. No life nor death. One could not observe the space-time continuum from outside it because one could not do anything at all outside of it. If you were to exist outside of time, it would be as if you occupied a single instant. A single, unmoving point, entirely frozen. And that’s a bit how space-time works. It’s static, and it doesn’t change, but unlike something outside of time, space-time contains time. Space-time is the flow of time even though it doesn’t flow itself. I suppose it’s like how rivers don’t actually flow themselves, but rather it’s the water that’s in them that flows.

Hopefully that makes sense. Thanks for asking for clarification.


Awaiting your response,


2.1 – Personal Identity

The question is this: who am I metaphysically?

The question of “Who am I?” is a fascinating one with many different types of answers which we may discuss at length in the future. The type of answer that I care about today is the metaphysical one.

Suppose I have an identical twin, and we have lived a good, long life, staying close to each other throughout our lives and we are now 80 years old. We are looking through old photos surprised at how far we’ve come. In many of the photos, it is difficult to tell us apart, and even now, sometimes our grandchildren mistake us for each other. In many ways, my old self is more similar to my old twin than my old self is to my young self, and my young self is more similar to my young twin than my young self is to my old self. Despite this, it is very obvious that my young self is me. My young twin and I share memories, interests, a childly form and more that I don’t share with my younger self, and yet it seems ridiculous to consider that my young twin is me even close to the extent that I, my older self, am me, my younger self. Why is this? What ties me to my younger self?

This example shows that genetics isn’t the tie. My identical twin and I share the same genetics, and he is not me. It isn’t physical similarity either. You may have heard of the Ship of Theseus thought experiment. Suppose there is a ship, that slowly has its pieces replaced until all of its pieces are eventually different from when it was first built. Is it still the same ship? You may have also heard of the idea that all of the atoms in our body are replaced over some time (about a year, even though some cells like brain cells last a lifetime). So we are like the Ship of Theseus. You could say that you, I and the Ship of Theseus are made of fungible parts.

Fungibility is generally used as an economic term, but I’m adopting it for this conversation. It means that something is totally interchangeable. Any ordinary $5 bill has the same value as any other ordinary $5 bill and two $5 bills have the same value as a $10 bill. This means that bills are fungible. In the same way, atoms and ship parts are fungible. Swapping them around doesn’t have an effect, so even if you are a lot different in a year, you won’t literally be a different person.

Alright, so we’ve established some intuition about this matter, but now it’s time to get into some grittier stuff. Namely, why is a figurative Ship of Theseus still itself after any amount of time at all? Does it perdure or endure? Perdurantism is the idea that physical objects have temporal parts. A perdurantist would suppose that <you> are a sort of four-dimensional “snake” that has one end at the moment you come into being, the other end at the moment you no longer are, and a thickness of the shape of you. Endurantism is the idea that you exist wholly in the present at every moment, but the identity of you “endures” from moment to moment.

Again I will leave you, Jonah, with this introduction and the statement that I agree with the idea of perdurantism as opposed to endurantism.


Awaiting your response,


1.1 – Presentism vs Eternalism

The question is this: do the past and the future exist?

Philosophical presentism is the view that neither the future nor the past exist–only the present. Eternalism says that they all exist, even if the former two are inaccessible.

The problem is that is can’t be resolved empirically. There is nothing that says that any moment is now except that it is the moment that we are currently experiencing. Now is entirely subjective to our experience, so if one were to visit the past or the future, it would become now to the observer, and it would exist. The question is whether it exists before it was traveled to.

Since this discussion revolves heavily around the idea of time, it will be helpful to imagine that one could move freely through it. This is of course, time travel. Jonah and I will be discussing many of the different aspects of time and the consequences of traveling though it. We’ll mostly focus on metaphysics and philosophical ideas, but I’m sure we’ll broach the physics as well.

I’ll start off the discussion by siding with eternalism–that the future and past do exist, and we’ll go from there.


Awaiting your response,